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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There are numerous discrepancies between the record and the 
statement of facts contained in the brief of plaintiff and appellee, pages 2 
through 6. Paragraph 7 on page 3 attempts to understate the amount of the 
support award, which is $1,387.00 per month, rather than $1,187.00 per 
month as claimed. [R. 309]. 
Paragraph 8 on page 3, incredibly, asserts that the child support 
calculation included the imputation of income to the plaintiff. On October 
24, 1994, the court rejected, once and for all, plaintiffs repeated attempts 
to advance this proposition, stating in his ruling from the bench: 
There is nothing in the file, an I guess this 
is almost like negative judicial notice, but I do 
take judicial notice that there was nothing in the 
file to indicate that there was a attribution or 
assumed income to the plaintiff. 
[R.620]. Plaintiff and her counsel should be able to recall representations 
made by them to the court at a pre-trial in August of 1992, that plaintiff was 
prepared to present medical testimony as to her complete inability to hold 
employment and that therefore the child support calculation in this matter 
would be based solely upon defendant's income. [Affidavit of defendant and 
appellant, page 2, paragraph 2, attached as exhibit "B" to the addendum]. 
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Paragraph 10 on page 4 of appellee's brief consists of plaintiffs 
unsupported testimony which was fully refuted by defendant on the record 
and cannot be considered as established for the purposes of this appeal or 
otherwise. Plaintiffs attempt to characterize this version of facts in the 
record as "unrebutted" [sic] represents a complete misrepresentation of the 
facts. Her affidavit testimony and statement at paragraph 10 on page 4 of 
her brief that defendant " . . . acknowledged that, due to plaintiffs 
remarriage, that would be the last year that he would claim the exemptions 
. . ." are fully rebutted and denied by defendant's second affidavit in support 
of his motion to compel repayment, delivered to the court for filing and 
served upon counsel for plaintiff on July 11, 1994, which specifically states: 
3. Paragraph 8 of plaintiff s affidavit is 
false. I have never on any occasion stated that I 
would not exercise my right to claim the 
exemptions, but have consistently maintained the 
position that I am entitled to do so, and have 
always exercised that right based upon tax 
liability resulting from income of the plaintiff. 
A complete copy of defendant's affidavit is attached as Exhibit "C" to the 
addendum. [Second affidavit in support of motion to compel repayment, 
page 2, paragraph 3, attached as exhibit "C" to the addendum]. Plaintiffs 
misrepresentation on this issue inexcusable. 
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Defendant disputes plaintiffs statement at paragraph 16 on page 5 of 
the brief of appellee that "plaintiffs counsel prepared an order which 
included the court's finding's and conclusions." Defendant objected to the 
order precisely because the court never even purported to make findings and 
conclusions and counsel for plaintiff had prepared findings and conclusions 
which did not accurately reflect what was stated by the court from the 
bench. The court agreed with defendant, ordered that counsel for plaintiff 
prepare a simple order denying defendant's motion and fiirther ordered that 
a transcript of his ruling be attached as an essential part of the order so that 
there would be no further attempts at unilateral interpretation of the court's 
statements from the bench. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's notice of appeal is timely. The court's order of May 2, 
1995, is a valid final, appealable order which was signed by the court when 
the transcript of the October 24, 1994, hearing became available as an 
essential part of the order and the record. This court has complete 
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
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While plaintiff bases her argument on what she contends to be the 
"economic realities" of the parties, she ignores both the plain language of the 
decree and the most basic economic realities of the parties. The decree is 
based upon and establishes the two most basic economic realities of the 
parties: (1) that plaintiff has no income and does not contribute financially 
to the support of the parties' minor children and (2) that defendant is the 
only party who contributes support to the parties5 minor children of 
$1,387.00 per month based upon an income figure of approximately $65,000 
per year. [R. 309, Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.14, at p. 673, attached 
as exhibif'D" to the addendum]. 
Plaintiff cannot avoid the plain meaning of paragraph 16 of the decree, 
which requires the defendant to pay to plaintiff only for a difference in "her" 
tax liability. This language and simple principles of equity and fairness 
dictate that defendant should not be required to pay a difference in tax 
liability resulting solely from the income of plaintiff s present husband in 
order to purchase the exemptions. 
Plaintiffs attempt to characterize her version of facts in the record as 
undisputed represents a complete misrepresentation of the facts. Her 
affidavit testimony and statement at paragraph 10 on page 4 of her brief that 
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defendant " . . . acknowledged that, due to plaintiffs remarriage, that 
would be the last year that he would claim the exemptions . . ."are rebutted 
and denied by defendant. Plaintiffs misrepresentation of the facts on this 
issue is inexcusable. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL IS 
TIMELY AND THIS COURT HAS FULL 
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS 
APPEAL 
The order signed by the court and entered on May 2,1995, constitutes 
the valid final and appealable order on the issue before this court and is the 
subject of a timely appeal, notice of which was filed on June 1, 1995. It is 
the original order prepared by counsel for plaintiff and sent to defendant for 
his signature approving it as to form. It was submitted to the court when the 
transcript of the hearing of October 24,1994, became available as part of the 
order and the record. 
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Defendant objected to the first order prepared by counsel for plaintiff 
because of its attempted characterization of the court's ruling from the 
bench. To resolve the objection, the court, at a hearing on January 95 1995, 
instructed counsel for the plaintiff to prepare a simple order denying 
defendant's motion and instructed defendant to obtain a transcript of the 
October 24, 1994, hearing, which was to be included in the record as an 
essential part of the order, in anticipation of this appeal. Defendant was 
advised shortly thereafter that the reporter who transcribed the hearing 
would be unavailable and unable to provide a transcript for an extended 
period of time. When defendant received the proposed order from counsel 
for the plaintiff, he corresponded with counsel for plaintiff, advising him of 
the problem with obtaining a transcript and further advising that because the 
transcript was essential to the appeal he would hold the original order for 
submission to the court when the transcript became available. Defendant's 
correspondence to counsel for plaintiff is not part of the record in this case, 
but, as a convenience, a copy is included as exhibit "A" to the addendum. 
A copy of the correspondence was forwarded to the court. [Addendum, 
exhibit "A"]. When defendant was advised advised that the transcript would 
be ready shortly, he proceeded to sign the order approving it as to form and 
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submitted it to the court to be entered, trusting that the transcript would be 
placed in the file in time for the notice of appeal. [Affidavit of defendant and 
appellant, paragraphs 9 -13 , pages 3 and 4, attached as exhibit "B" to the 
addendum]. 
The court signed the order on May 2, 1995, and the defendant, after 
having relied upon the professional courtesy and integrity of counsel for 
plaintiff and the court, further relied upon it as a valid order in filing the 
notice of appeal herein. Defendant had no knowledge of the entry of any 
previous orders prior to the receipt of the brief of appellee on January 20, 
1996. [ Affidavit of defendant and appellant, paragraph 14, page 4, attached 
as Exhibit "B" to the addendum]. 
The May 2, 1995, order is a valid and appealable order and is, in fact, 
the only order is properly accompanied the transcript which the court 
ordered to be included therewith. The court, by signing this order, 
recognized that the transcript was essential to the order and this appeal. 
This appeal should not be dismissed on a technicality as urged by 
counsel for plaintiff, particularly in a case such as this, where the course of 
the proceedings since the entry of the decree of divorce is fraught with 
numerous errors, which are evident from the record. 
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After sustaining plaintiffs objection to the commissioner's 
recommendation of August 16, 1994, the court prepared a minute entry 
overruling the objection, which is precisely the opposite of what he intended 
and had ruled from the bench. [R. 443]. 
Defendant filed an objection to the first order prepared by counsel for 
plaintiff. The objection is missing from the record, however, the court 
obviously received it as evidenced by the notice of hearing on the objection 
dated December 12,1994. [R. 474-475]. In spite of this pending objection, 
the court signed the order submitted by counsel for plaintiff on December 
27,1994. [R. 476-480]. Given the pendency of a valid objection, this order 
certainly could not be considered valid, as argued by plaintiff, and it is clear 
that the court did not consider it a valid order. 
The court's notice of hearing on the objection was mailed on 
December 12, 1994, and scheduled the hearing for January 9, 1995, 
however, notice of the hearing was never mailed to defendant, rather the 
clerk's mailing certificate shows that it was erroneously addressed to 
defendant at the office of counsel for the plaintiff. [R. 475]. Counsel for 
plaintiff, having received two notices of the same hearing, one of which was 
directed to defendant and mailed to the wrong address, did nothing to advise 
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the defendant of the hearing. On January 9, 1995, Defendant received a 
phone call from the court and appeared on five minutes notice, without an 
opportunity to prepare. [Affidavit of defendant and appellant, paragraphs 4 
and 5, page 2, attached as exhibit "B" to the addendum]. 
At the hearing on January 9,1995, defendant advised the court of the 
erroneous minute entry, which was thereafter corrected with a second minute 
entry. [R. 512]. The court resolved the objection to plaintiffs order by 
directing counsel for plaintiff to prepare a simple order denying the 
defendant's motion and directing defendant to obtain a transcript of the 
October 24, 1994, hearing, which was to be included as an essential part of 
the order for the purpose of accurately preserving the court's statements 
from the bench for review on appeal. 
By signing the order on May 2, 1995, the trial court recognized the 
importance of the transcript as part of the record, and entered the order to 
remedy once and for all the numerous errors and confusion surrounding the 
motion and his rulings. The order constitutes the final, appealable order 
signed and entered by the court. 
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II 
THE COURT'S RULING SHOULD BE 
REVERSED PRECISELY BECAUSE IT 
IGNORES BOTH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 
THE DECREE AND THE MOST BASIC 
ECONOMIC REALITIES OF THE PARTIES 
The brief of appellee argues that the trial court's ruling is consistent 
with the "economic realities of the parties' circumstances," and then 
contends that plaintiffs tax filing status is somehow the single most 
important and basic economic reality of the parties. [Brief of Appellee, p. 
12]. Plaintiffs tax filing status is irrelevant to any issue before this court. 
She is free to file a joint return with her husband and will continue to be free 
to do so regardless of the outcome of this appeal. The most basic of the 
economic realities of these parties are: (1) that the plaintiff is unemployed, 
by choice, and does not provide financial support for the parties' minor 
children and (2) that defendant is the only party to this action who has 
provided and continues to provide financial support for the parties' minor 
children in the amount of $17,000 per year. The decree — which fixed child 
support at $1,387.00 per month, based upon the current child support table 
and income attributed solely to defendant of approximately $65,000 per 
10 
year, with no income attributed to plaintiff. [R. 309, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-45-7.14, at p. 673, attached as exhibit "D" to the addendum] -
incorporates and is based upon these undisputed facts. Plaintiff repeatedly 
urges upon this court what is unfounded speculation and cannot be 
substantiated from the record, i.e., that her current husband's income is 
utilized or is somehow necessary for the support of minor children whose 
needs can be more than adequately met by defendant's child support. While 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-4.1, may impose a duty of support upon a step 
parent, there is simply no evidence in the record to support plaintiffs 
assertions in subparagraphs 4 and 5 on page 12 of her brief that plaintiff and 
her husband provide support. 
At a pre-trial in this matter in August of 1992, the trial court 
specifically stated to defendant and his counsel that he could not award the 
tax exemptions to defendant because he was bound by the precedent of 
Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988). [Affidavit of 
defendant and appellant, paragraph 3, page 2, attached as Exhibit "B" to the 
addendum]. In fact, under the precedent of this court's opinions in Motes 
v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989), and Allred v. Alfred, 835 P.2d 
974 (Utah App. 1992), both of which predate the decree of divorce, the trial 
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court had full authority to award the exemptions to defendant, by simply 
making the appropriate findings of fact that defendant ". . . has the higher 
income and provides the majority of the support for the child or children 
whose exemption is claimed . . .." Motes, at 239. Allred. at 978. Under 
these authorities the two most basic economic realities — (1) that defendant 
was and remains the only party to this action earning income and (2) that 
defendant was and remains the provider of 100 per cent of the support--
gave the trial court full authority to award the exemptions to defendant. 
Plaintiff cannot escape these basic economic realities, which are 
established as undisputed in the record. The decree itself fixed child support 
at $1,387.00 per month, based upon income attributed solely to defendant 
of approximately $65,000 per year and no income attributed to plaintiff. 
[R. 309, Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.14, page 673, attached as exhibit 
"D" to the addendum]. Plaintiffs contention at page 12 of her brief that 
there was no evidence upon which the court could base a finding of who 
provides the greater support is nothing short of ludicrous. [Brief of Appellee, 
p. 12, footnote 2]. Moreover, plaintiffs assumption in footnote 2 on page 
12 that the unsubstantiated claim of support by a step parent should 
somehow be considered as an "economic reality" by the court under the 
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authority of the Allred case is completely unfounded. [Brief of Appellee, p. 
12, footnote 2]. 
Plaintiffs contention at page 16 of her brief that her affidavit 
testimony is " unrebutted" [sic] is simply false. Plaintiff claims that 
defendant " . . . indicated that he would not be 'purchasing5 the 
exemptions in the future because the plaintiff would be filing a joint return 
and it would not be economical for the defendant to purchase the exemptions 
in that event." [Brief of Appellee, p. 16]. Defendant's second Affidavit in 
support of his motion to compel repayment, delivered to the court for filing 
and hand delivered to counsel for plaintiff on July 11, 1994, specifically 
rebuts this allegation as follows: 
3. Paragraph 8 of plaintiffs affidavit is 
false. I have never on any occasion stated that I 
would not exercise my right to claim the 
exemptions, but have consistently maintained the 
position that I am entitled to do so, and have 
always exercised that right based upon tax 
liability resulting from income of the plaintiff. 
[Second affidavit in support of motion to compel repayment, paragraph 3, 
page 2, attached as exhibit "C" to the addendum]. Plaintiffs 
misrepresentation of the facts on this issue is inexcusable. It is no surprise 
that the error-plagued record does not contain the original of this affidavit 
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or the accompanying reply memorandum of defendant in support of the 
motion to compel repayment, however, the commissioner reviewed these 
pleadings before ruling in defendant's favor and counsel for plaintiff cannot, 
in good faith, deny that he received copies of them, as evidenced by the 
certificate hand delivery attached thereto. 
Plaintiff must face the most basic of economic realities which have 
been established without dispute and cannot avoid the plain meaning of 
paragraph 16 of the decree, which requires the defendant to compensate 
plaintiff only for a difference in "her" tax liability. This plain language and 
simple principles of equity and fairness dictate that defendant should not be 
required to pay a difference in tax liability resulting from the sole income of 
plaintiffs present husband in order to purchase the exemptions. 
CONCLUSION 
The notice of appeal is timely. The court signed and defendant relied 
upon a valid order which was entered on May 2, 1995, and appealed from 
on June 1, 1995. The plain language of the decree, the most basic economic 
realities of the parties and principles of fairness and equity dictate that 
defendant not be required to pay a difference in tax liability resulting solely 
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from income of plaintiffs present husband in order to purchase the tax 
exemptions for his children. For the reasons stated above defendant 
respectfully renews his request that this court: (1) reverse the trial court's 
denial of his motion to compel reimbursement, (2) order plaintiff to pay to 
defendant the total sum of Five Thousand, forty-three and 00/100 Dollars 
($5,043.00), paid to plaintiff and incurred by defendant in additional tax 
liability, together with interest at applicable legal rates and, (3) instruct the 
trial court to enter an order consistent with the commissioner's mling of 
August 16, 1994, that to purchase the exemptions he be required to pay 
plaintiff only for tax liability resulting from plaintiffs income, exclusive of 
the income of her present husband In addition, in the event that this 
appeal is ruled upon after April 15, 1996, defendant requests that he be 
awarded the amount paid to plaintiff or incurred in additional tax liability as 
a result of not being able to claim the exemptions for the 1995 tax year. 
DATED this of February, 1996. 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
Def&idant and Appellant 
Attorney, Pro se 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROGER R. FAIRBANKS was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this of February, 1996, to the following: 
Frederick N Green 
GREEN & BERRY 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ROGER R.FAIRBANKS 
Defen^mt and Appellant 
Attorney, Pro se 
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ADDENDUM 
Correspondence from defendant to attorney for plaintiff dated January 
16, 1995, a copy of which was forwarded to the court. 
Affidavit of defendant and appellant. 
Defendant's second affidavit in support of motion to compel, dated 
July 8, 1994, and certified hand delivered to counsel for plaintiff on 
July 11, 1994. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.14, pages 671 and 673. 
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EXHIBIT A 
LAW OFFICE OF 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-7977 
Facsimile (801) 532-1597 
January 16, 1995 
Frederick N. Green 
GREEN & BERRY 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Fairbanks v. Fairbanks, Civil No. 914902005 
Dear Mr. Green: 
I have received the order you forwarded on January 9, 1995. Judge Murphy's clerk advises 
that the reporter who transcribed the hearing on October 24, 1994, will be unavailable and unable 
to provide a transcript for an extended period of time. Because the transcript will be essential to an 
appeal, the order should not be signed and entered until we can be sure that the transcript is available 
for filing so that it may be included in the record before the filing of a notice of appeal. 
Accordingly, I will keep the original order, sign it approving as to form and submit it to the 
court for signature and entry when the transcript becomes available for filing therewith. 
Thank you for your courtesy in tliis matter. Please contact me should you have questions or 
concerns. 
Very truly yours, 
RRF/adh 
cc: Judge Michael R. Murphy 
EXHIBIT B 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, 3792 
Defendant and Appellant, Pro Se 
8543 South Nutwood Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: 1(801)568-5178 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
JILL (FAIRBANKS) EYRING ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. , 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
) AND APPELLANT 
\ Case No. 950371 - CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Roger R. Fairbanks, having been first duly sworn upon oath deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am the defendant and appellant, above named, and have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth below. 
2. In August of 1992, at a pre-trial in this action, counsel for plaintiff 
specifically stated to the court that plaintiff was prepared to present medical testimony 
as to plaintiffs complete inability to hold employment and that therefore the child 
support calculation in this matter would be based solely upon my income. 
3. At the same pre-trial, the trial court specifically stated to me and my 
counsel that he could not award the tax exemptions for the children to me because he 
was bound by the precedent of the Martinez case, which he understood as requiring him 
to award the exemptions to the custodial parent. He went on to state that he would 
award me the right to purchase the exemptions by paying to plaintiff the difference her 
tax liability, which became the basis for the inclusion of paragraph 16 in the decree of 
divorce. 
4. I did not receive any of the hearing scheduled for January 9, 1995, on my 
objection to plaintiffs proposed order and discovered, upon review of the court file that 
it was never mailed to my correct address, rather the clerk's mailing certificate shows 
that it was erroneously addressed to me at the office of counsel for the plaintiff. 
5. Counsel for the plaintiff did nothing to advise me of the hearing, in spite 
of the fact that he received two notices of the same hearing, one of which was directed 
to me and was obviously mailed to the wrong address. 
6. On January 9, 1995,1 received a phone call from the court and appeared 
on five minutes notice, without an opportunity to prepare. 
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7. At the hearing, I advised the court that the original minute entry was in 
error; it was thereafter corrected with a second minute entry. 
8. The court resolved the objection by instructing counsel for plaintiff to 
prepare a simple order denying the motion and further instructing that I obtain a 
transcript of the October 24, 1994, hearing, which was to be included in the record as 
an essential part of the order, in anticipation of this appeal. 
9. I was advised shortly thereafter that the reporter who recorded the 
hearing would be unavailable and unable to provide a transcript for an extended period 
of time. 
10. When I received the proposed order, I corresponded with counsel for 
plaintiff, advising him of the problem with obtaining a transcript and further advising that 
because the transcript was essential to an appeal, I would hold the original order for 
submission to the court when the transcript became available. A copy of my 
correspondence to counsel for plaintiff is included as exhibit "A" to the addendum to my 
reply brief, filed herewith. 
11. I also forwarded a copy of the correspondence to the court. 
12. When I was ultimately advised that the transcript would be ready shortly, 
I proceeded to sign the order, approving it as to form and submitted it to the court to be 
entered, secure in the knowledge transcript would be placed in the file in time for the 
filing of a notice of appeal. 
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13. I filed the notice of appeal on June 1, 1995, after having relied upon the 
professional courtesy and integrity of counsel for plaintiff and the court, and further 
having relied upon it as a valid order in filing the notice of appeal herein. 
14. I had no knowledge of the entry of any orders prior to the entry of the 
May 2, 1995, order, until I reviewed the of the brief of appellee which I received on 
January 20, 1996. 
DATED this of February, 1996. 
RogdWl. Fairbanks 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this III day of February, 1996 
(1 Y\^OLTK L . SlcLu^lon^ 
Notary Public 
ResidineJn: SaJL^r LO\^C
 1 llT 
My commission expires: 
^ Fsg&BhK Notary Public ^ 
f] -. • A
 n o YOf^iQ, I ^ S M f e § k ANGELA t TAYLOR I 
IA.pnjJL ^ n , r n o i™5tmU «*>8oath200Eatt#301 i 
I i V Q l n 8artUk* City, Utah 84111 ! 
! % W 7 My Commotion Expirw I 
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EXHIBIT C 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, 3792 
Attorney Pro Se 
261 East 3 00 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7977 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE_COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JILL FAIRBANKS ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ; 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, 
Defendant. 
I SECOND 
) AFFIDAVIT OF | ROGER R. FAIRBANKS | IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
i TO COMPEL REPAYMENT 
i Civil No. 91-4902005DA 
Judge: Michael Murphy 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Roger R. Fairbanks, having been first duly sworn upon oath 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am the defendant, above named, and have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth below. 
2. Paragraph 7 of plaintiff's affidavit of May 16, 1994, is 
completely untrue. Plaintiff has never made any demand for a W-2 
form from me, and such a demand would futile, in any event, as I 
am unemployed and do not receive a W-2. Plaintiff has yet to 
produce a copy of her tax return for 1993, and provided copies of 
her W-2 only after this motion was filed. 
3. Paragraph 8 of plaintiff's affidavit is false. I have 
never on any occasion stated that I would not exercise my right to 
claim the exemptions, but have consistently maintained the position 
that I am entitled to do so, and have always exercised that right 
based upon tax liability resulting from income of the plaintiff. 
In fact, as the file herein substantiates, for 1992, the plaintiff 
only signed over the exemptions for the children within one hour 
of a hearing I scheduled on a motion to compel her to do so. 
Plaintiff willfully and flagrantly refused to sign over the 
exemptions for 1992 even though she owed no tax and could still 
receive earned income credit of $500 from the federal government. 
4. Paragraph 9 of plaintiff's affidavit is false. Plaintiff 
has never attempted to discuss taxes with me. I have consistently 
advised plaintiff of my intention to claim the exemptions. I 
demanded plaintiff1s W-2 and tax return in early March of 1994, 
when plaintiff failed to comply with the February 28 deadline 
imposed under the divorce decree. 
5. Paragraph 11 is false. Plaintiff and her husband have yet-
to provide copies of the return actually filed, and only provided 
figures and drafts of a proposed return after this motion was 
filed. 
6. Paragraph 12 is not only completely false, it is basied 
upon an alleged conversation to which the plaintiff was not even 
a party. Plaintiff is not competent to testify except * upon 
2 
personal knowledge. In any event I did not make such statements. 
I did make it clear to plaintiff's husband that I intended to 
contest plaintiff's violation of the divorce decree, and seek 
reimbursement, after her refusal to sign over the exemptions in 
compliance with the decree. 
7. It appears to me that Plaintiff's husband has tried to 
be cooperative in dealing with the situation. Even when he finally 
produced a copy of plaintiff's W-2 after this motion was filed, he 
stated that he was providing the W-2 against plaintiff's wishes. 
8. Paragraphs 14 through 16 appear to me as an attorney to 
be an attempt to make arguments which have no place in an 
affidavit, and should be made in an opposition memorandum-
9. In October of 1992, as a result of constant telephone 
harassment by the plaintiff of partners, associates and staff at 
Christensen Jensen & Powell, I was asked to leave the firm-
10. Since October of 1992, I have been unemployed and have 
done the best I can to earn a livelihood as a sole practitioner-
11. The divorce decree herein awarded plaintiff child support 
based solely upon income of $65,000 attributed to me. Plaintiff 
was prepared to have medical practitioners testify that she was 
incapable of employment. My monthly child support payment is 
$1387.00. 
12. Within one month of the settlement of this matter, the 
plaintiff became-employed. 
13. During a very difficult time of unemployment, which 
continues to the present, I have continued to maintain my child 
3 
support payments current, even though my income for 199 2 was 
$58,000 ($7,000 less than the amount contemplated by the decree) 
and my income for 1993 was $39,000 ($26,000 less than contemplated 
by the decree) . Out of consideration for the needs of my children, 
I have not sought a reduction in child support. Copies of my 1992 
and 1993 tax returns are attached hereto as exhibit "A*11 
14. My child support payments are current, with no amount 
owing to plaintiff. 
15- My child support payments are never more than a few days 
late; X pay the plaintiff when 1 pick up the children for 
visitation. The payments rarely clear my checking account within 
the week and many have remained unnegotiated by the plaintiff for 
up to three weeks-
DATED this day of July, 1994. 
~0&r&du£^ 
Rogegz R. Fairbanks 
Notary Public 
Res id ing i n : UdUSC^ L^Z^nC^r 2$k/. 
l!y7eq^~^~i^J5!K^^"T 
*fctr;£*mtiA 261 East 300 South S3C0 i 
I J KlKC-M b! Salt lake City. Utah flai 11 ' 
! \^~z2s June 17, 1997 I 
l — » ! ^ £ i _ State o/Utah J 
-?~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing, this /f day of July, 1994, to the following: 
Frederick N. Green 
GREEN & BERRY 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
m^r^rhtJ^x 
EXHIBIT D 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7.14 
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion; and 
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed five, who 
represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor 
may consider appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed 
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association. 
(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the child support guidelines to 
ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate child 
support award amounts. 
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim 
Committee on or before October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before 
October 1 of every fourth year subsequently. 
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the major-
ity of the committee, as well as specific recommendations of individual 
members of the committee. 
(3) The committee members serve without compensation. Staff for the com-
mittee shall be provided from the existing budgets of the Department of 
Human Services and the Judicial Council. The committee ceases to exist no 
later than the date the subsequent committee under this section is appointed. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.13, unacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
1989, ch. 214, § 15; 1990, ch. 183, § 58. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
"Human Services" for "Social Services" in Sub-
section (3). 
78-45-7.14. Child support obligation table. 
The following is the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table: 
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
(Both Parents) 
(Adjusted for FICA, and federal and state taxes) 
Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income Children 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Less 
than 
$200 
$200 
225 
250 
275 
300 
325 
350 
375 
400 
425 
$20 
$23 
25 
28 
51 
56 
60 
65 
69 
74 
78 
$28 
$34 
38 
42 
67 
73 
78 
84 
90 
96 
102 
$30 
$35 
39 
43 
67 
73 
79 
85 
91 
97 
103 
$31 
$35 
39 
43 
68 
74 
80 
86 
92 
98 
104 
$32 
$36 
40 
44 
69 
75 
81 
87 
93 
99 
105 
$33 
$36 
40 
45 
69 
76 
82 
88 
94 
100 
106 
$34 
$37 
41 
46 
70 
76 
83 
89 
95 
101 
107 
$35 
$38 
41 
46 
70 
83 
83 
89 
96 
102 
108 
$35 
$38 
42 
47 
71 
84 
85 
90 
97 
103 
109 
$36 
$39 
42 
48 
71 
85 
86 
91 
98 
104 
110 
671 
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Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income 
$2,100 
2,200 
2,300 
2,400 
2,500 
2,600 
2,700 
2,800 
2,900 
3,000 
3,100 
3,200 
3,300 
3,400 
3,500 
3,600 
3,700 
3,800 
3,900 
4,000 
4,100 
4,200 
4,300 
4,400 
4,500 
4,600 
4,700 
4,800 
4,900 
5,000 
5,100 
5,200 
5,300 
5,400 
5,500 
5,600 
5,700 
5,800 
5,900 
6,000 
6,100 
6,200 
6,300 
1 
$265 
267 
275 
283 
285 
290 
298 
313 
321 
330 
339 
348 
357 
366 
375 
384 
393 
402 
419 
427 
435 
443 
451 
459 
477 
485 
493 
501 
509 
517 
525 
534 
564 
570 
577 
583 
590 
596 
603 
609 
616 
622 
630 
2 
$432 
447 
461 
476 
482 
497 
511 
532 
547 
562 
577 
592 
607 
622 
637 
653 
668 
683 
706 
720 
735 
749 
764 
778 
802 
816 
831 
845 
860 
874 
889 
903 
939 
951 
963 
976 
988 
1,001 
1,013 
1,025 
1,038 
1,050 
1,062 
3 
$557 
576 
595 
614 
625 
644 
663 
689 
708 
728 
747 
766 
786 
805 
824 
844 
863 
882 
909 
928 
947 
966 
985 
1,004 
1,032 
1,050 
1,069 
1,088 
1,107 
1,126 
1,145 
1,164 
1,203 
1,220 
1,236 
1,252 
1,269 
1,285 
1,302 
1,318 
1,334 
1,351 
1,367 
4 
$637 
659 
680 
702 
715 
737 
758 
787 
809 
831 
853 
875 
897 
920 
942 
964 
986 
1,008 
1,038 
1,060 
1,082 
1,103 
1,125 
1,147 
1,177 
1,199 
1,221 
1,243 
1,264 
1,286 
1,308 
1,329 
1,372 
om 
1,410 
1,429 
1,448 
1,467 
1,485 
1,504 
1,523 
1,542 
1,561 
Children 
5 
$701 
725 
749 
772 
788 
812 
836 
866 
890 
915 
939 
963 
988 
1,012 
1,036 
1,061 
1,085 
1,109 
1,142 
1,166 
1,190 
1,214 
1,238 
1,262 
1,295 
1,319 
1,343 
1,367 
1,391 
1,415 
1,439 
1,463 
1,508 
1,529 
1,550 
1,571 
1,592 
1,613 
1,634 
1,655 
1,676 
1,697 
1,718 
6 
$754 
780 
805 
831 
849 
875 
900 
932 
959 
985 
1,011 
1,037 
1,063 
1,089 
1,115 
1,142 
1,168 
1,194 
1,228 
1,254 
1,280 
1,306 
1,332 
1,358 
1,393 
1,419 
1,445 
1,471 
1,497 
1,523 
1,549 
1,575 
1,621 
1,644 
1,666 
1,689 
1,712 
1,734 
1,757 
1,780 
1,802 
1,825 
1,847 
7 
$798 
825 
853 
880 
899 
927 
954 
988 
1,016 
1,043 
1,071 
1,098 
1,126 
1,154 
1,181 
1,209 
1,237 
1,264 
1,300 
1,328 
1,355 
1,383 
1,411 
1,438 
1,475 
1,502 
1,530 
1,558 
1,585 
1,613 
1,641 
1,668 
1,716 
1,740 
1,763 
1,787 
1,811 
1,835 
1,859 
1,883 
1,907 
1,931 
1,954 
8 
$835 
863 
892 
921 
942 
970 
999 
1,034 
1,063 
1,092 
1,121 
1,150 
1,179 
1,207 
1,236 
1,265 
1,294 
1,323 
1,360 
1,389 
1,418 
1,447 
1,476 
1,505 
1,543 
1,572 
1,601 
1,630 
1,659 
1,688 
1,717 
1,746 
1,795 
1,820 
1,844 
1,869 
1,894 
1,919 
1,943 
1,968 
1,993 
2,018 
2,042 
9 
$865 
895 
925 
955 
977 
1,007 
1,037 
1,073 
1,103 
1,133 
1,163 
1,192 
1,222 
1,252 
1,282 
1,312 
1,342 
1,372 
1,410 
1,440 
1,470 
1,501 
1,531 
1,561 
1,600 
1,630 
1,661 
1,691 
1,721 
1,751 
1,781 
1,812 
1,861 
1,886 
1,912 
1,937 
1,963 
1,988 
2,014 
2,039 
2,064 
2,090 
2,115 
10 
$890 
921 
952 
983 
1,006 
1,037 
1,068 
1,105 
1,136 
1,167 
1,197 
1,228 
1,259 
1,290 
1,320 
1,351 
1,382 
1,412 
1,452 
1,483 
1,514 
1,545 
1,576 
1,608 
1,648 
1,679 
1,710 
1,741 
1,773 
1,804 
1,835 
1,866 
1,916 
1,942 
1,968 
1,994 
2,020 
2,046 
2,072 
2,097 
2,123 
2,149 
2,175 
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